Comparison of recent changes in the US and Russian Army related to officer personnel

Bektas Baktybayev

Links: http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2016-4/#no-3-china-18

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44389.pdf

https://topwar.ru/100673-gde-generalu-nayti-leytenantov.html

http://izvestia.ru/news/654626

Russia and the USA have the strongest armies in the world. That’s why it would be interesting to compare the military power of these two states. The aim of this blog is to analyze the recent changes in the US and Russian armies related to the officer personnel, which is responsible for army management.

            According to Kapp, who is a specialist in the military manpower policy, the number of the most senior military officers (often called GFOs) and other officers in the USA decreased compared to the period of the heat of the Cold War. Surprisingly, the proportion of officers to the total force is increasing despite the decrease in the number of officers. Kapp came to that conclusion based on the statistics of the Defense Manpower Data Center. Kapp claims that the share of the GFOs and officers increased by approximately 40 % during the period 1965-2015. Kapp explains this constant tendency with the following four reasons.

 First of all, the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) requires the creation of more joint GFOs positions. Officers are motivated to serve high ranking positions due to the new institutional arrangements.

            The second reason comes from the security issues. The US military often organizes coalition operations with their allies in order to enhance their military capabilities. The experience and authority of the GFOs are necessary to carry out complex contingency and coalition operations. The third factor leading to the increase in the officers’ proportion to the total force was a significant decrease of the Armed forces. During the same period of time (1965-2015) the total force in the US army was decreased twice from 2,655,389 to 1,313,940. Finally, the advanced technology development replaced the manpower which resulted in the decreased need for human resources.

            In contrast, the number of officers in Russia has been increasing in recent years. It was due to the failed attempt of the ex-minister of defense Anatoliy Serdyukov to reorganize military affairs. During his period of rule, the number of officers significantly decreased from 335 000 to 150 000. The main reasons for this significant reduction were the optimization and restructuring of the armed forces of Russia. However, Russia faced serious problem of an acute shortage of staff due to the unsatisfactory results of Serdyukov’s reform. The thousands of experienced and skillful officers were expelled from the army and were forced to hold the position of reserve officers or vacant positions of sergeants.

            At this moment Russian army under the direction of new minister of defense Sergey Shoygu needs seriously trained commanders in order to organize strong professional army. It will take several years to restore the former condition of the Russian army. The reason for this is that the necessity for 5-6 years to train enough amount of officers, who are professionals of military affairs and are able to use modern equipment. Currently, the 24 % of armed forces in Russia are holding officers’ positions which is higher compared to US army, where this number is 17,5 %. Many officers-sergeants in Russia reassigned to officers’ position because of shortage of officers resulted from the previous reform. However, there is a still need for 50 000 soldiers and contract sergeants in Russia.

The Turkish path to One-man Rule

Akbota Karibayeva

A week of parliamentary debates on the controversial bill that would implement serious constitutional changes to the political system of Turkey has finished on January 16 by the two-third majority vote in favor. The popular referendum is now to decide whether the position of prime minister in the Turkish government is to be abolished, the president’s power is to be increased, and the independence of judicial branch - undermined.

While the future of the Turkish state is (hopefully) in the hands of Turkish people, the way president Erdogan has played the post-coup situation to his own benefit is worth noting. The attempted military coup that took place in mid-July 2016 resulted in intensification of the sense of crisis and people’s need in ensuring the strong government. Reinforced by the terrorist attacks, the coup facilitated people’s unification and greater endorsement of the Erdogan’s regime. This, in turn, unleashed a justified abuse human rights in pursuit of restoration of stability.

Yet, Erdogan did not limit himself by a witch-hunt on the suspected organizers of the coup. He went further and made use of the political opportunity to cement his position by proposing a bill that would have hardly played out previously. Now, when the public supports him as never before and a good number of pro-Kurdish opposition (HDP) MPs is imprisoned for indirect association with Fethullah Gulen, Erdogan is one step away from declaring a one-man rule in Turkey. Accusing the current judiciary in falling under the influence of Gulen - the coup organizer according to the Turkish government - Erdogan made a good case for justifying the extension of president’s powers to directly intervene in the judiciary. The proposed changes are intended to elevate the Turkish political system to the level of that in France and the US. Indeed, I would agree, “efficient government”, as Erdogan sells it, is urgently needed in Turkey. But it does not have to be a dictatorship.

Was the coup organized by Gulen, as the government claims, or it was all staged by Erdogan’s regime? We don't know. What we do know, though, is that Erdogan has clearly played this card very well for himself.

This case demonstrates that, indeed, military insecurity causes a paradoxical reaction chain, just like Porter has described in his “War and the Rise of the State” (1994). On the one hand, the attempted coup mobilized the Turkish people from different party backgrounds to go out and protest against the putschists. On the other hand, the people, even having learned from the Amnesty International about the terrible extensive human rights abuses by the government, did not start doubting the regime’s authority. This way, the sense of military emergency caused a flash of democratic mobilization that not-yet-but-almost resulted in a more dictatorial regime. 

Trump is against NATO

Zhanara Omarova

New US President Donald Trump expressed his opinion that NATO is becoming useless. He stated that NATO is old because it was created long years ago and the main problem is that it cannot protect the United States from terrorism. He explained it by low funding which other countries should fund in order to support NATO. He also criticizes EU and says that Britain had made a good choice when they decided to leave the EU.  Trump criticized Germany and its leader Angela Merkel for the allowance of free movement of refugees and states that Europe can no longer protect itself from terror. Prussia or modern Germany the first country where military forces appeared as an effective organized structure (Huntington 1957) and now according to  Trump cannot no longer defend itself from terrorism.

I think  Terrorism is  a modern type of war. Different countries handle this problem in different  ways. This type war as other types need troops, funding and structure. As Porter(1994) states war leads to development of logistics, improvement of universal education and healthcare but first of all in order to do that  things we need money and that is why Trump emphasizes that lack of funding in NATO leads to its inefficient  function. Report from defense expenditures of NATO   countries shows that only 5  NATO member states out of 28 states spend enough money and the leading role take up USA which is very unfair according to US president.

I would like to explain this issue by collective action and free riders problem. Huntington states that military is monopolized by the state and if certain state has army this state allocates enough money and this army is governed by certain state. Which makes this army structured. However, NATO does not belong to one special country and here arises the question of free-riding where one state rely on another in terms of funding but all states want to use security that offers NATO. Huntington states that modern military officer should be educated expert with responsibility but in order to train such officer military needs financing which is core problem of NATO today. Last year Obama sent 3500 troops and more than 100 vehicles to Poland as a response to Russian aggression but now  there is a question:  will the new president return these troops back to the US?

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Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

Porter, Bruce D. 1994.War and the Rise of the State 1st ed. Free Press

Military Veterans' High Profile Politics

Dilshat Zhussupova

Link: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/election/2016/08/06/retired-generals-election-questions/88289162/

http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/mattis-questions-defense-secretary-rules-retired

The principled and practical arguments for and against the current case of waiving the rule mandating seven years to pass before retired Marine Corps General James Mattis may lead the US Department of Defense are more clear-cut in comparison to the more nuanced considerations necessary when looking at US veterans’ high profile involvement in politics, to which I would like to direct your attention.

The importance of not mixing politics with official duties is taken as seriously today as it was in the most serious of professionalization efforts of military science in the nineteenth century, with senior military leaders faithfully upholding the expert and limited nature of the military profession (Huntington 1957, 70). One could not have specialized competence within this profession whilst wielding that competence outside it, namely in politics, which would only serve to undermine military officers’ professionalism and professional values (1957, 71). However, the prohibition of not mixing politics with official duties does not extend to veterans and, with a look at the 2016 political campaigns, it is important to consider the consequent effects on civil-military relations, if any.

Recent examples of veterans’ high profile roles in politics include Michael Flynn, a retired Army Lieutenant General and former Defense Intelligence Agency director, participating in the Republican Convention as a featured speaker and John Allen, a retired Marine Corps General, supporting Hillary Clinton on the final night of the Democratic National Convention with an equally passionate speech.

There may be two ways of looking at these developments. According to Martin Dempsey, retired Army General and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, there is wisdom in seeking advice of senior military leaders like Flynn and Allen yet keeping them off the stage, for it sets a harmful perception that military leaders may be susceptible to following politics rather than the professional practice of following the chain of command in their decision making.

According to Barbara Perry, director of presidential studies at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, the general public does not mind but, in fact, appreciates the continued engagement of veterans in public service due to their invaluable expertise, a sentiment stretching back the country’s first president and retired Continental Army General, George Washington. Veterans having adopted a strong political position in their retirement period appears to be the exception to the general observation of apolitical veterans, so it appears to be a matter of not whether veterans can engage in politics or not, but as to where the line that should not be crossed lies.

A course of action to ensure that lines are not ultimately crossed may be informed by Huntington’s emphasis on the expert and limited nature of the military profession. After all, if a professional requirement to not mix politics with official duties is faithfully upheld by the military institution, it seems likely that, by their retirement, such behavior would be sufficiently internalized by individuals so that they would refrain from taking the path of Flynn and Allen to the extreme.

What would Huntington say about Mattis’ appointment as a Secretary of Defense?

Viktoriya Malikova

Link: http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/james-mattis-confirmation-hearing-takeaways-233550

The article “Democrats’ role for Mattis: The anti-Trump” deals with a recently hotly debated topic about the potential appointment of the ex-general Mattis as the US Secretary Of Defense. The main issue is that according to the American law a military official can serve as a defense secretary only if seven years passed since his leaving the army. This law is closely connected to the theory of the civil military relations about need of civilian control over the army. In the case of Mattis, the period of seven years has not passed, so, in order to be exempted from this law Mattis’ candidacy must be approved by the Parliament.  This article discusses the results of Matis’ hearing in the Senate and it emphasizes an unexpected support of Mattis by the Democrats. This can be explained by the fact that the democrats consider Mattis to be able to balance Trump’s politics. It can be seen from the questions which the senators posed to Mattis, clarifying his views on some disputable points.

Mattis’ answers have shown that concerning some issues his position is different from that of Trump’s, for example about Russia – he does not support Trump’s approvals of Putin, NATO – unlike Trump, he emphasizes the importance of this organization. Mattis stated that he is ready to defend his position to the President while giving him advice. This gives the Senators the hope that Mattis would be able to provide a check on the President.  The author, however, ends his article with underlying the fact that, Mattis avoided criticizing the President-elect explicitly, for example during the questions when he was asked to comment some of Trump’s Twitter posts.

Apart from the question about whether Mattis can and will balance Trump’s politics, the appointment of the ex-general to the position of  the US SECDEF touches upon the principle of the civilian control over military, which in this case is not followed. One of the Civil-Military Relations theorists, Huntington, would clearly disapprove such decision as according to him the soldiers do not become good ministers. Moreover, he would not agree with the logic behind Democrats’ approval of Mattis. Huntington claims that the military official should not disagree with a politician and obey his decision and orders even if the policy is aimed at promoting the politician’s rather than nation’s interest. Thus, basing on the Clausewitz’ theory cited in Huntington it might be concluded that Mattis cannot and should not oppose or balance Trump’s policies. Thus, according to Huntington, Democrats are wrong in their hopes about Mattis and should not support him as he will not realize their hopes about balancing Trump’s politics. Therefore, civilian control would be more efficient and appointment of Mattis would have negative consequences, according to Huntington.

I would also agree that Democrats are too optimistic in their hopes about Mattis’ keeping Trump in check as it is unclear if Mattis can be as good in politics as he is in the military sphere, and Trump does not seem to be a person who would easily bend to the advises of even a professional officer if the officer’ views would differ from his own ones.

Trump's Untraditional Appointments to Cabinet

Azamat Kabdrash


More generals were nominated to the President’s cabinet since WWII. Sounds intimidating, doesn’t it? At least three military generals are going to be appointed to Trump’s Cabinet. Retired General James Mattis has been nominated as the Defense secretary; retired Marine General John Kelly has been nominated as the Homeland security secretary; and retired Army Lieutenant General Michael Flynn has been appointed as the National security adviser.

Is this situation going to affect civil-military relations in political decision making? Would it undermine peaceful resolutions of military conflicts? To what extent can US politics turn extreme?

Huntington (1957) claimed that Ministers of military affairs do not have to be former soldiers. He argued for what he called “objective civilian control” over military. He stated that military viewpoint in politics can undermine efficiency of decision-making. Favoring the neutrality of military in state politics keeps military as a state tool, which, in turn, should be controlled by civilian ministers (58).

It seems that Donald Trump has a different opinion. His appointment of General Mattis as the Defense secretary is the most noticeable among others. Constitutionally it is prohibited to take the position of Defense secretary for military officers. At least 7 years should pass since an officer retired from military service. As Mattis retired in 2013, he will need a special waiver approved by Congress (which seems to be almost done) to allow to take that position.

Are these appointments really justified so that Congress should process a special waiver for Mattis? I present two facts that would support that they are justified.

Firstly, military members (especially generals) tend to have very conservative overviews. They are well adapted to live by rules and orders. Liberal values such as individualism and self-determination are very uncommon among them. Building a presidential cabinet, own circle, a team needs reliable people whom you can trust and consult with. In this regard, competent and, what is more important, “obedient” generals is a good choice for Trump to appoint them as secretaries.

Secondly, the whole beauty of the US Government is laid upon the check and balance system. What does it mean? Constitutionally the three branches – legislative, executive and judiciary – function with no prevailing authority over one another. It means that no decision is made, no bill is passed, no law is issued without the approval of all the three branches. Therefore, even if the Cabinet secretaries (representing an executive branch) might have utterly different standpoints on the US politics, it wouldn’t have extreme changes as long as there are two other branches left.

The three mentioned above appointed secretaries are highly expert former military professionals.  Time will show us how they will perform their duties in civilian service. I hope that their unique military backgrounds would demonstrate how effective can civil-military relations be.

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Drezner, D. W. 2016. My concern with Trump’s team of generals. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/05/my-concern-with-trumps-team-of-generals/?utm_term=.05bc3932ee33

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

Wright, A., & Herb, J. 2017. Democrats’ role for Mattis: The anti-Trump. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/james-mattis-confirmation-hearing-takeaways-233550

Insight into General Mattis From Huntington (1957)

Today in class we talked about the first four chapters of Huntington's (1957) classic: The Soldier and the State.  In the third chapter, Huntington outlines the professional military ethic, or what he calls the "military mind."

One quote from this description of the outlook of military men on the world stood out to me in particular: "The military ethic...places unusual value upon the ordered, purposive study of history.  History is valuable to the military man only when it is used to develop principles which may be capable of future application" (Huntington 1957, 64).

I was checking up on an old friend who had messaged me on Facebook earlier.  He had a link to an article about General Mattis, the Trump nominee for Secretary of Defense.  The article is about an email that he sent during his tour in Iraq in 2003 about the value of reading, and the fact that the email has recently "gone viral."

I read the story and the email and was struck by how much, nearly 60 years since Huntington began describing the profession of military officers, Mattis played to type. After outlining the books he's read before and during various deployments, Mattis has this to say about war and the obligations of officers to the profession (emphasis mine):

We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we don’t know a hell of a lot more than just the TTPs? What happens when you’re on a dynamic battlefield and things are changing faster than higher HQ can stay abreast? Do you not adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? 

I started the class out last week with a blog article about the potential dangers of trump nominating generals who are still relatively "fresh" out of the military to key civilian posts. It will be interesting to see if Mattis can be successful in a "political" role when he has been very professional as a soldier.  Huntington gives much more credence to the political role - it is wider, more ambiguous, and more difficult than the narrowly applied application of violence to carry out the political goals of the state.

Reading Huntington and then Mattis, I can agree with him on one point: there is nothing new under the sun.
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Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

Introduction to the Blog

Welcome reader! This blog is an element of the course "Civil-Military Relations" that I am teaching to undergraduate students at Nazarbayev University during the Spring 2017 semester.  It is meant to help students engage with current events and the theoretical literature about the relations between society and the military and state institutions and the military. Writing posts about current events that tie with this theoretical literature is one of many ways that students can earn points.

The beauty of the blogging format is that it breaks students of the bad habits that they develop when writing only for professors of trying to sound too smart.  It is a problem that professors have when they write for each other as well.  However, the need to make persuasive arguments, to use evidence, and to apply theoretical concepts to practical problems, are the skills that we wish to impart to our students.

Please feel free to engage with the content on this blog through comments and questions.  Questions about the course can be addressed to me (spencer.willardson[at]nu.edu.kz).  We hope that you find the content interesting, the analysis focused, and the concept as useful as we do.