Showing posts with label Civilian Control. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civilian Control. Show all posts

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Japan seeks to Reduce Civilian Control of the Ministry of Defense

Dinara Khalelova

Officials of Japan’s Ministry of Defense was planning to propose to the Diet corrections for the decision making structure of the Ministry of Defense. Their main aim was to make Self-Defense Force officers on equal footing with their civilian bureaucratic counterparts. This amendment gives civilians greater control over Self Defense Force (SDF). According to the Japan Times (2015), initiative was given from SDF personnel as well as former members who are now Diet lawmakers.
Simply, by this reform the chiefs of staff of the SDF branches will support the minister as equals to the director-general of ministry bureaus and the director-general of the Minister’s Secretariat. Also, SDF units assigned to respond to a contingency will be able to report directly to the minister and the minister can instruct SDF units directly through the chief of staff of each SDF branch (The Japan Times, 2015).

There are two types of control, according to Huntington (1957). First one is subjective civilian control, where professionalism of military is maximized, and decreases the control of civilians. Second type of civilian control is subjective, it is instead maximizes power of civilians by governmental institutions, social class, and constitutional form. However, Huntington prefers objective control over subjective. Because, as it was said above, objective civilian control maximizes military professionalism.

This shows that Japan`s Ministry of Defense is trying to reinforce the power of the subjective civilian control. Despite the fact that the objective civilian control is more beneficial for the state military. Japan`s amendment allows to uniformed officers to directly participate in works of the ministry.

______________
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/22/national/defense-ministry-seeks-to-reduce-civilian-control/#.WPnui_l97AU

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State the Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Generals in the Government: Problems with Overriding the Law.

Kamila Shurmanova

Jim Mattis, appointed by President Trump as Defense Secretary, is a newly (3 years out of active service) retired officer. He recently proposed that the use of military force against ISIS should be legalized. His main claim is that the terrorist has already erased the limits of time and geographic issues by their acts. Mattis argues that the idea of military response to the ISIS has been in his head for several years now and that he is very surprised that it has not been even brought to debate yet.   Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford has supported Mattis’ ideas and they both argued that more budget should be given to the Defense, so they can ‘reclaim military readiness’. Defense Secretary also pointed out that law has made US military more damage than on field battles with enemy.

"I can find nothing in the Budget Control Act that helps our national security," Mattis testified, adding that the law places Congress in a "spectator role."


Mattis’ proposed actions are very militaristic and focused on the aggression towards an enemy. He proposes to stop endless discussion and start acting, these judgments might come from the fact that Mattis has not fully re-entered civilian life and is still thinking as a military officer rather than a civilian authority. In the US there is a law that a military officer might start political service only 7 years after his retirement, so he can have time to get out of the military judgment. Pr. Trump has closed his eyes on this law when he appointed Jim Mattis to the position of Defense Secretary, despite all the doubts that other authorities had. Judging from the propositions that Mattis gives it is evident that he is still biased and his  ideas are limited by his military habits.

____________

Wednesday, March 1, 2017

Army Chief in Pakistan promotes the idea of civilian control of the military.

Author: Viktoriya Malikova

Links: http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-army-chief-asks-officers-to-read-book-on-success-of-indian-democracy/story-wa7Ii1EiHEkBYmmiHVZTmK.html

Shvetsova and Barany in their analyses of such countries as Russia, Romania and Slovenia, describe how depolarization of the military is difficult in the states which had a long history of autocracy. Barany, in particular, claims that as the support of military was vital for the soviet regime, possibility of military being apolitical was never mentioned. Therefore, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the depolitization of army takes a time to be changed. This process, however, can be even more difficult in the case of a country which went through a military type of the regime and experienced a number of coups. This can be clearly seen from the example of Pakistan. The author of the article explicitly emphasizes that “the fact that Pakistan is a country which has been ruled by the army for almost half its history” make the civil military relations in it very difficult.

The author also makes a hint that one of the reasons for why the previous army chief left his post because of his bad relations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It is another clear example of the tensions in the civil-military relations. The fact that this person is no longer in power may be example of government’s using one his tools to “punish” the disobedient armed servant by firing him.
 The current Army Chief Bajwa, seems to take this problem of civil-military relations very seriously and he makes certain attempts at tackling it. In particular, this article discusses Bajwa’s unusual public advice to the Pakistani officers to read a book called “Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence” which, as it can be predicted from its name, discusses building of the civil-military relations in democratic countries, focusing on India example. This advice is twice unusual as Baija encourages Pakistani officers to learn from India – a country with which Pakistan has tense relations.

In general, such recommendation may demonstrate that the current Pakistani Army chief supports the classical Huntington’s theory about importance of the civilian control over the military. For example, his own words were that “competition between the civilians and the military is counter-productive for the country.” The practice, however, shows that, in spite of this beautiful rhetoric, the army in Pakistan continues to actively oppose the government. In the recent land disagreement, for example, Balja himself explicitly disagreed with the government. It follows that there is a gap between the military words and actions.

Therefore, Balja’s promise of supporting and assisting the government under the moto of “United we rise” should be followed by clear definitions of such assistance which should not imply intervention into the politics. Pakistan clearly has a long way ahead before finding the balance in the civil military relations and establishing of the civilian control.

______________
References:

Shevtsova L. 1996. “Russia’s Fragmented Armed Forces.” In Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Edited by Diamond, Larry, and Marc F, Plattner. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Barany Z. 2012. Chapter 7. in The Soldier and the Changing State. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.