Mass protests against corruption in Russia as a test for civil-military relations

Author: Azamat Kabdrash

In March 26 there was a mass protest throughout Russia which covered 85 cities and involved more than one hundred thousand people (Aljazeer.com, 2017). A couple of weeks before that event Aleksey Navalniy, the major opposition member and a founder of a non-governmental organization called “Fund against corruption”, released his video of investigation about illegal acquisitions (yachts, mansions, wine yards etc.) of the Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. In the video Navalniy openly accused Medvedev and the government of corruption. As no constructive explanation was given by government officials, nor by Medvedev himself, Navalniy called people to go to anti-corruption meeting demanding explanations to the charges.

The protests went in peaceful manner. However, members of the military and police suppressed the procession from the very beginning, taking people to police trucks and arresting them. More than one thousand people were arrested compiling administrative protocol on them. Lately, it was announced that all arrested people were freed, only a few man being imposed a criminal punishment because of having hardly injured police officers in the conflict arisen during the protest. Navalniy himself was arrested immediately after his appearance at the protest, afterwards jailed for 15 days. Recently, on April 12 he released a new appealing video claiming that government officials still have not given a constructive response for accusations, and therefore calling everyone to join a new anti-corruption protest on June 12, on the national holiday.

I want to look into this event from the perspective of “civil-military problematique” proposed by Feaver (2003). One of the aspects of this theory discusses a mechanism that is created between civilians and military. Ideally military should serve as a tool of civilians to protect security. But what if there is a conflict of interests. Feaver claimed that in this case politics involves a coercive power. In fact, we can see the suppression of the protests in Russia, and we see the coercive power in terms of military suppressing the protesters. Of course military performs its duty. But, it was a peaceful protest, as Navalniy claimed himself. It was citizens expressing their discontent about the corruption taking place in the government. However, this mere fact of suppression of citizens undermines civil-military relations. Because, this is the example of Feaver’s argument on the situation when a coercive power becomes a threat to those whom it was supposed to protect (p.4). In addition, we are certainly not sure about what policemen think about going against the will of people who peacefully went out to the streets. After Navalniy was released, he told that in 15 days in jail, he had plenty of conversations with the guards and members of the police, talking about the protest, explaining the situation with the corruption in the government. He said that these policemen agreed with and even supported his appeal to fight against corruption. Of course, it is not an indicator of what the rest of military think of it. However, the mere fact that such contrast might really exist even in the military itself points to the aspect of “civil-military problematique”. Because military should serve as a tool to protect its citizens. However, if there is a contrast between civil ruling elite and ordinary citizens it might lead to coercion of the latter, or undermine civil-military relations between the former.

Citations

Dobrokhotov, R. (2017, March 29). Russia's new protest generation. Retrieved April 13, 2017, from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/russia-protest-generation-170329113346416.html

Feaver, P. (2003). Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Failed coup in Gambia, did it really fail?

Author: Kamila Shurmanova 

https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/04/03/world/africa/ap-af-gambia-exhumations.html

Powell (2012) states that even though the reasons to initiate the coup might relatively coincide, the vulnerability to coups of the countries defer. Before starting the coup conspirators should assess the chances for success, possible losses and costs in case it fails. They should also assess individual consequences, such as imprisonment, exile or execution (Powell 2012). In Gambia there was an attempted coup in December of 2014. This coup has failed and some of the initiators were killed, some sentenced, including four participants with US citizenship. New York Times reports that bodies of three coup initiators were exhumed in order to identify causes of death and allow families to bury them properly. This decision was made because after 3 years after the coup was attempted, the charges against the initiators, who are still alive, are being dropped and they are re-joining army. The charges were dropped, because former President Yahya Jammeh, interesting fact is that he himself was among initiators of a successful coup in 1994, was recognized as a thief, human rights abuser and he was also found guilty of several other crimes, including alleged shooting of students. In December 2016 as a result of elections Adama Barrow became new president of Gambia, shortly after that Jammeh was exiled because he refused to leave his post (New York Times 2017). The article reports that the new President of Gambia was the one who triggered the reverse of repressions and pardons for coup conspirators of 2014. 
This example of an attempted coup proves the theory of Powell and Chacha () that coups, even unsuccessful once trigger democratization. The initiation of investigations on Jammeh started shortly after the coup was attempted, after that Human Rights group accused him of governing unjustly, and killing and torturing opponents (New York Times 2017). And the President who replaced him, Adama Barrow, was an active member of United Democratic Party in Gambia. Powell and Chacha argues that different states, they discussed those who are economically stable and closely tied to international actors (Gambia may be counted as one, because it refers to international organization for aid and resolving acute political issues), have a fair chance of democratization after an attempted coup. Both this article and the research on coups have significantly contributed to the civil-military relations studies, because they reflect how military can influence domestic and foreign policies of the country and lead to the change of political regime.