Personnel Decisions in Poland and Civilian Control

Over the course of the semester, we've discussed a number of ways that the state can control the military.  One nexus of control that fits under the two main types of control described by Huntington (1957) is the use of personnel policies to control the composition of the officer corps.  While at first blush, the use of promotion and retention policies might seem to be subjective control, having clear standards in place which emphasize loyalty to the state and civilian-led institutions can lead to greater professionalization and the ideal of objective control.

In February, Poland's government got rid of 90 percent of the top officers (Link).  One issue that was raised was that many of the top brass were recruited and trained before the collapse of the communist system and that many of them received their training in the Soviet Union. This could raise some question about the loyalty of the top officers and their institutional ties to the state (Russia) that Poland views as its biggest threat.

From the article:

Last month, General Mieczyslaw Gocul, chief of staff of the Polish armed forces, resigned and was replaced by Lieutenant-General Leszek Surawski. 

Gocul's departure had followed that of General Miroslaw Rozanski, who had shifted chains of command in the army, air force, navy and special forces to improve the general staff's strategic planning. 

The move was said to have infuriated the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has vowed deep reforms of the judiciary, state media and other institutions.

A major shift of military resources and organization without the approval/consent of the civilian government is a major potential problem in terms of civil-military relations. Whether such a shift allows for better planning and execution by the military is a conversation that should be had, but if those decisions were made unilaterally by the military, the response by the government is appropriate.