Akbota Karibayeva
A
week of parliamentary debates on the controversial bill that would implement
serious constitutional changes to the political system of Turkey has finished
on January 16 by the two-third majority vote
in favor.
The popular referendum is now to decide whether the position of prime minister
in the Turkish government is to be abolished, the
president’s power is to be increased, and the independence of judicial branch -
undermined.
While the future of the Turkish
state is (hopefully) in the hands of Turkish people, the way president Erdogan
has played the post-coup situation to his own benefit is worth noting. The attempted
military coup that took place in mid-July 2016 resulted in intensification of
the sense of crisis and people’s need in ensuring the strong government. Reinforced
by the terrorist attacks, the coup facilitated people’s unification and greater endorsement
of the Erdogan’s regime. This, in turn, unleashed a justified abuse human rights in pursuit of
restoration of stability.
Yet, Erdogan did not limit himself
by a witch-hunt on the suspected organizers of the coup. He went further and
made use of the political opportunity to cement his position by proposing a
bill that would have hardly played out previously. Now, when the public
supports him as never before and a good number of pro-Kurdish opposition (HDP) MPs is imprisoned for indirect association with Fethullah Gulen, Erdogan is one step away
from declaring a one-man rule in Turkey. Accusing the current judiciary in
falling under the influence of Gulen - the coup organizer according to the Turkish government - Erdogan made a good case for justifying the extension of president’s
powers to directly intervene in the judiciary. The proposed changes are
intended to elevate the Turkish political system
to the level of that in France and the US. Indeed, I would agree, “efficient government”, as Erdogan sells it,
is urgently needed in Turkey. But it does not have to be a dictatorship.
Was the coup organized by Gulen, as
the government claims, or it was all staged by Erdogan’s regime? We don't know.
What we do know, though, is that Erdogan has clearly played this card very well
for himself.
This case demonstrates that, indeed,
military insecurity causes a paradoxical reaction chain, just like Porter has
described in his “War and the Rise of the State” (1994).
On the one hand, the attempted coup mobilized the Turkish people from different
party backgrounds to go out and protest against the putschists. On the other
hand, the people, even having learned from the Amnesty International about the
terrible extensive human rights abuses by the government, did not start doubting
the regime’s authority. This way, the sense of military emergency caused a
flash of democratic mobilization that not-yet-but-almost resulted in a more dictatorial
regime.
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