Monday, April 24, 2017

Chinese Military Modernization

Zhandos Bolatbek

Toronto in his article “Why Professionalize? Economic Modernization and Military Professionalism” argues that states with higher human capital, urbanization, and economic wealth levels are more likely to professionalize.

Toronto states: “Now, more than ever, states and societies are concerned with the efficient use of military resources, and the information age has made the adverse consequences of military operations even more acute.”

Annie Kowalewski puts forward why the world’s most powerful military, the US, should learn about military modernization from Chinese army.
China has been the most prominent state in the world in terms of its rate of accruing economic wealth and the swift rise of its middle class. Along with the economic modernization it has also been modernizing its army.

As this age of information demands, China has been investing its efforts at enhancing its asymmetrical technological advantage. US Department of Defense reported that China is “developing its counter-space, offensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare capabilities meant to deny adversaries the advantages of modern, information technology-driven warfare.” For the Chinese Army priorities now include winning “informational local wars” and merge cyber- and space-related training into its military program.

Since December 2015, Chinese Army, People’s Liberation Army, has altered its structure of command. According to the Chinese military reforms, 7 Theatre Commands have been established according to their geographical proximity. Each of these Theatre Commands are obliged to oversee potential threats in their own regions and have to coordinate their efforts with other Theatre Commands. The shift from Soviet-style centralized command allows for more flexibility and coordination in the defense efforts.

However, there has been long held view that Chinese military is a “Paper Tiger”, that is, Chinese military looks strong and capable at the first glance, but only to that extent. Those viewing Chinese army as Paper Tiger underscore that compared to the US Army, which has had extensive and intensive experience of fighting in combat, Chinese army lacks just that. And that gives US an upper hand.

On the other hand, for the past decade and more, the US army has mostly been used to fighting and containing insurgency threats. As the author of the article argues: “The training necessary to combat insurgent groups with limited weaponry greatly differs from the training necessary to operate and utilize high-end technologies against a modern adversary. The Department of Defense’s entrenched bureaucracy also makes it difficult to adapt to new types of threats that require a quicker response time.”

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Reference: 
Toronto, Nathan W. “Why Professionalize? Economic Modernization and Military Professionalism”. Foreign Policy Analysis.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-america-can-learn-chinas-peoples-liberation-army-20239?page=3

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Is there any problem with Military education in Kazakhstan?

Aigerim Suleimenova

The military education in Kazakhstan starts from the school when students are taught the basics of military equipment, this is called Basic military training. This is a required subject for all schools in Kazakhstan, however there are also special Military boarding schools in Almaty, Shymkent, Karaganda,”Zhasulan” military school for gifted boys, cadet corps named after Chokan Valikhanov where students live and military education, physical training, patriotism development, military –progess orientation are taught.

After school, there several higher education institutions Kazakhstan National Defense university, Military institute of air defense forces and so on where students get a higher military education and after a graduation can get an officer rank. Also there is ab obligatory military service for citizens from 18- 27 for one year. However now there is an existence of one month short military service which is accounted as a obligatory military service that was mentioned before, the payment for this is about 300.000 tenge.
From the first sight it can be seen that military education in Kazakhstan is developed, however the quality not quantity matters. Which kind and quality of military officers do it produce? As Karen Guttieri suggested (Bruneau and Tollefson)  education is a “central function of military organization”. Here it is important to highlight thay military education is not only about knowledge about military, equipment, training, specific skills but also is about values and behavior, morale and – obedience to authority. Also this is  supported by Huntington's characteristics of professional officer.  However as we can see from the examples like in Aktau the soldier was jailed because of the disobedience to higher rank officer because this soldier “ did not want to do the actions, because of many younger soldiers around, and he is an older time soldier” the military education of Kazakhstan gave not what is needed.

The need of a new military education was suggested by Bakytzhan Abdiraiym, the head of Military strategic research center. According to him there are three problems in military education lack of new equipment and military vehicles, second is inefficient management system and third is a quality of military education (!!!) This shows that there is a way of development of military education and we believe that this will be improved.
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References
1. https://en.tengrinews.kz/military/Kazakhstan-needs-new-military-education-system-18068/
2. http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/07/11/feature-01
3. https://www.mod.gov.kz/rus/obrazovanie/srednee_obrazovanie/?cid=0&rid=385
4. http://old.el.kz/m/articles/view/content-23637
5. https://www.mod.gov.kz/rus/obrazovanie/srednee_obrazovanie/?cid=0&rid=384
6. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-aktau-arestovali-soldata-za-otkaz-vyipolnyat-prikaz-314799/
7. Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson. 2008. Who Guards the Guardians and How:

Democratic Civil-Military Relations. University of Texas Press.

The Effects of Turkey's Referendum on Its CMR

Dauren Koptleuov

On April 17, Recep Taiyp Erdogan announced the victory for his campaign in the National referendum on significant constitutional changes in the Turkish Parliament. Success of the “Yes” campaign granted Erdogan considerable expansion of powers, turning Turkey’s parliamentary system into presidential (Al-Jazeera, 2017). Media reports tell about severe violations and fraudulence during the polls; prosecution of media; threats and various pressure on the supporters of “No” campaign; massive protests on the streets led by outraged crowd (Huffington Post, 2017). Apparently, Erdogan denies it all, and he certainly has his reasons.

After the attempt of coup d’état last summer, Erdogan strives to secure his position and increase the influence of his figure over the state by proposing constitutional changes. It is reported that the results of recent referendum will most probably be followed with more purges, imprisonments, adoption of the death penalty and development of a nuclear weapon (Huffington Post, 2017). In some way or another, the victory of the Erdogan’s campaign will have a significant effect on Turkish civil-military relations as well.

First of all, the results of constitutional referendum will abolish the functioning Turkish legislature with Binali Yildirim (Turkish prime-minister) in the head of it (The Washington Post, 2017). According to Giraldo (2008), the key function of legislature is to work as a check on the power and influence of executive on the defense sector, as well as maintaining “accountability, legitimacy and transparency” of the policy (Giraldo, 2008 as cited in Bruneau and Tollefson, 2008). In the current context of Turkey, the first function lost its purpose and the second one will presumably narrow down to “loyalty to ruling party” and to be promoted by the military police.

Speaking of the military police, Erdogan most probably wants to be aware of everything that happens within the Turkish military in order to avoid repeated coup attempt. This increases the likelihood that Erdogan can create special task force that would either implicitly or explicitly control the military from within. Considering that the percentage of “Yes” and “No” voters is quite levelled: 51.3% against 48.7%, Turkey is seemingly experiencing big division over political preferences. Apart from creation military police and regular purges, Erdogan is likely to enhance paramilitary forces that will secure his safety, even if the coup or insurgency would actually happen. Therefore, it can be said that Turkish military budget will probably also be the subject to change.

Finally, such increase in political powers of a single person may also affect the military doctrine of the state. Erdogan, as a political leader, fits perfectly the term “boss”, described by the Weeks (2014). She states that such authoritarian leaders, that have low possibility of being influenced by other political elites and high level of war-prone behavior, usually have higher possibility of war initiation as well (Weeks, 2014). Taking into consideration recent statements about stopping the fight with ISIS and plans of nuclear weapons (Huffington Post, 2017), it can be assumed that Turkey may start to pose threats to neighbor states as well international community, which may become the primary topic of interest very soon.

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Links and references:

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson. 2008. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. University of Texas Press.

Weeks, Jessica L. P. 2014. Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/turkey-referendum-ak-party-claims-victory-170416162645193.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkish-referendum-when-democracy-falls-short-of-a_us_58f23649e4b048372700d8a9

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/17/what-erdogans-narrow-referendum-victory-means-for-turkey/?utm_term=.cb0808f32636

Unchanging attitudes towards LGBT in Russian military

Zhandos Bolatbek

While the US is attempting to bridge the gap between civilians’ and military’s attitude towards members of LGBT community, Russia is staunchly trying to retain and conserve the old attitudes of its military toward members of the LGBT community. As Huffington Post reports, central administration in Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation “has developed a technical guide” featuring “physical examination”. This physical examination will include checking for tattoos in especially sensitive areas, such as sexual organs, buttocks and areas near the face. The justification for these kind of examinations seem to be stemming from the assumption that tattoos are a proxy for low level of cultural and educational levels, according to the guide. St. Petersburg Times stated that the presence of tattoos in these sensitive parts of the body may reveal “sexual deviations”. The guide also states that in the case when the influence is found to be external, it would demonstrate recruit’s “malleability” and “disposition to submit to another’s will”. The move by the Russian Defense Ministry seems to reflect the wider Russian agenda to suppress any LGBT movement, with the major legislation on anti-gay propaganda already in place. Whether the new guide will contribute to the anti-LGBT agenda is highly doubtful, since it is very difficult to discern “sexual deviations” from tattoos in recruits’ sensitive parts of their bodies.

These measures show how the Russian government is averse to give way for more tolerance of LGBT recruits in the army which stands in sharp contrast with the US military. As Feaver and Kohn found out there was a considerable gap between civilian population and the military where the former was much more tolerant towards LGBT serving in the military and the latter was somewhat disapproving. There was also “Don’t ask, don’t tell Act” which required that the recruits and officers kept their sexual orientation secret. However, since the publication of Feaver and Kohn’s findings “Don’t ask, don’t tell Act” was repealed and gave the right of LGBT recruits to openly disclose their sexual orientation. This indicates how Russian and American attitudes diverge in terms of views on LGBT people in the military. Although there seems to be strong intolerance towards LGBT people in the Russian army, UN’s 2007 report indicates that homosexuality and male prostitution is “quite common within Russia’s military”. It seems that attitudes towards LGBT people in the military will not change in the near time, since Kremlin is pushing for it and has the support of influential Russian Orthodox Church.

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Reference:
Feaver, Peter, and Richard H. Kohn, ed. 2001. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military 
Gap and American National Security. MIT Press. 


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/russia-gay-tattoo-check-soldiers-military-laws_n_2545637.html

Japan seeks to Reduce Civilian Control of the Ministry of Defense

Dinara Khalelova

Officials of Japan’s Ministry of Defense was planning to propose to the Diet corrections for the decision making structure of the Ministry of Defense. Their main aim was to make Self-Defense Force officers on equal footing with their civilian bureaucratic counterparts. This amendment gives civilians greater control over Self Defense Force (SDF). According to the Japan Times (2015), initiative was given from SDF personnel as well as former members who are now Diet lawmakers.
Simply, by this reform the chiefs of staff of the SDF branches will support the minister as equals to the director-general of ministry bureaus and the director-general of the Minister’s Secretariat. Also, SDF units assigned to respond to a contingency will be able to report directly to the minister and the minister can instruct SDF units directly through the chief of staff of each SDF branch (The Japan Times, 2015).

There are two types of control, according to Huntington (1957). First one is subjective civilian control, where professionalism of military is maximized, and decreases the control of civilians. Second type of civilian control is subjective, it is instead maximizes power of civilians by governmental institutions, social class, and constitutional form. However, Huntington prefers objective control over subjective. Because, as it was said above, objective civilian control maximizes military professionalism.

This shows that Japan`s Ministry of Defense is trying to reinforce the power of the subjective civilian control. Despite the fact that the objective civilian control is more beneficial for the state military. Japan`s amendment allows to uniformed officers to directly participate in works of the ministry.

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http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/22/national/defense-ministry-seeks-to-reduce-civilian-control/#.WPnui_l97AU

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State the Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Military Education in Kazakhstan

Daniyar Tengelbay


In March 2013 president of the Military-Strategic Research Center Bakytzhan Abdiraiym pointed that one of the main problems of Kazakhstan’s army is military education. He suggested to reconsider the whole system of military education and argued that Kazakhstan need highly intellectual officers, which study not only in military academies but also in top universities of the world. There was also stress on emotional factor as there is need in psychological fitness and stress resistance.

Since this time, Kazakhstan agreed with several states to cooperate in military education as part of bilateral cooperation. For example, agreement with China in 2015 regarding free technical assistance for Kazakhstan’s army and cooperating in military education. (Part of Kazakhstan’s military personnel is educated in Chinese military academies) Moreover, from fall 2016 Kazakhstan’s military academies introduced new disciplines as military ethics, military logistics, military radio electronics and engineering, military management and military jurisprudence. This is also a part of development of state’s military education.

In addition, Astana Times informs that US and Kazakhstan developed a project for 2016-2017 military cooperation. It is directed to improve professionalism of military and developing the military education. As US interested in regional security of Central Asia it will assist Kazakhstan’s military academies with teaching methods and considers cadets exchange.
 
According to Bruneau and Tollefson (2006), military education should inculcate loyalty to civilians and directed to avoid coups and other interference in states politics. It should develop professional behavior and teach respect and obedience to higher administration.


Kazakhstan is in right way of developing its military education as it cooperates with states that have strong militaries. It already had been improved much as young men willing to be in Armed forces are more than the army needs. This is mostly because military is in process of professionalization and military capacities are improved by time.

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http://astanatimes.com/2016/03/1-4/ 

https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/China-continues-strengthening-military-relations-with-262536/ 

https://en.tengrinews.kz/military/Kazakhstan-needs-new-military-education-system-18068/ 

http://bnews.kz/ru/redesign/news/kak_popast_v_elitnie_voiska_kazahstana

Bombing Syria: The US Needs to Adopt a New Authorization for the Use of Military Force

Aidana Sapuan

In response to Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against nonviolent Syrian citizens, on April 7, 2017 newly elected President Trump authorized 59 Tomahawk missile strikes. This has raised serious doubts about the lawfulness of Trump’s unilateral decision both under the US Constitution and the international law.

The US Constitution in Article I clearly states that the decision and responsibility to start a war belongs to Congress, not the president. Though the president can make a sole decision to repel sudden attacks, Assad’s recent actions in Syria do not represent such worries for the US national security.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Congress adopted the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to take violent actions against “those nations, organizations, or persons he (the president) determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”  This document has given a president of the US a mandate to make a unilateral decision to use force against a particular type of actors connected to a disastrous event in 2001. Nevertheless, during the following 16 years presidents have been using this resolution to justify operations in the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia and Syria, sometimes with a minimal connection to the main cause stated in AUMF.

In the context of this document, ISIS and Assad’s regime do not seem to fit the characteristics that would allow the sole decision to use force, since the former is an organization that did not exist in the time of 9/11 attacks, whereas Assad regime’s direct threat to US’s national security is under a big question. Therefore, the question of whether Trump’s decision violates US constitution still remains open.

There was a precedent during Obama’s administration that reflects today’s concerns around Trump’s order to deploy missiles in Syria. In 2013, Obama unilaterally authorized striking against Syria after Assad’s use of chemical weapons. This has provoked a big discontent among the representatives in Congress, which ended up by an unsuccessful presidential request to redesign and adopt a new AUMF . This precedent might explain the inactivity of current members of Congress as a kind of tacit consent to comply with Trump’s sole decision to use military force against Syria.


Nonetheless, though there might be a silent consensus between Congress and President Trump about the morals and motives for the use of US military force in Syria, do things have to stay the way they are? In terms of sustaining healthy civil-military relations, the answer is definitely no. The adoption of a new separate AUMF for Syrian conflict would define the scope of the mission and outline political and military objectives of potential military operations in Syria. Moreover, the Congress is in urgent need of providing the channel for public to check if the financial, human and military capability costs associated with the “war” is worthwhile for the Americans. President Trump’s unilateral decision to employ bombing attack in Syria and the following public debate over new AUMF is a real-world example of the theory by Avant explained in Bruneau and Tollefson (2008). Her theory, the division of civilian power between the executive and the legislature might potentially degrade the wellness of civil-military relations in the US, since instead of forming a bilateral decision, parties will try to “play one off against the other” and to promote its own interests (ibid, 61).

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Reference list:
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson. 2008. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. University of Texas Press

Web sources: 
https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumps-challenges-in-asking-congress-for-authorization-for-use-of-military-force/
http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/military-force-syria-congress
http://www.concordmonitor.com/Congress-must-act-on-new-Authorization-for-the-Use-of-Military-Force-9250103